Dialogues with Greco,
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"On the Domino Effect"

...a justification for American action* abroad...

Greco: Suvian, regarding U.S. foreign policy, have you ever heard of the "domino effect"?

Suvian: No, I haven't...

Greco: Well, the "falling domino principle" was a phrase first coined by our 34th president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, at a news conference on April 7th, 1954 ⁽¹⁾, when he was trying to explain to the press the strategic importance of Indochina to the free world. This period marks the beginning of U.S. involvement in Indochina, and as such, the public was largely ignorant of the reasons for that involvement (I will leave for another discussion the issue of why the public was ignorant of those reasons, then and for decades to come...)

Suvian: So what was the "domino effect" then?

Greco: Before I attempt to answer that, let me first propose that there are two versions of the domino theory, the first being the public version, and the other being the private version, internal to the government.

Suvian: Two interpretations...

Greco: Yes...let's start with the first. In that 1954 press conference, Eisenhower enumerated the public version of the domino theory, which was essentially a response to a perceived Communist threat. If the spread of Communism from Russia and/or China were left unabated, it could potentially topple Indochina, Southeast Asia, the "island-defensive chain" of Japan, Formosa and the Philippines, eventually threatening Australia and New Zealand, all in a domino-like effect that would see Communism grow at the expense of the "free-world". Such an outcome was deemed unacceptable and was used as a justification for military intervention in Indochina, i.e., to prevent the first "domino" from falling, as it were, and thus prevent any "domino effect" from spreading through the Asian-Pacific theater.

Suvian: Hmm...that sounds logical enough, but it strikes me as a bit propagandistic, as it appeals to the public's fear of Communism, which was running rampant at the time...

Greco: That's right...it certainly seems that the forces of propaganda were at work here, which is, if we consider the historical precedents, all to common in public explanations of government policy...

Suvian: So then if this was the public version, what was the internal one?

Greco: Well, let me preface that with an excerpt from Eisenhower's 1953 State of the Union address, in which he was explaining his aspirations for U.S. foreign policy at the time...

"A serious and explicit purpose of our foreign policy is the encouragement of a hospitable climate for investment in foreign nations." ⁽²⁾

This was a stated goal of Eisenhower's foreign policy. And now I want to ask you, what is the converse of this idea? What is the other side of its "coin", so to speak?

Suvian: Hmm...the other side....

Greco: Yes, for that is where we can begin to shed light on the private version of the domino effect, the one internal to the government...

Suvian: Which is what, exactly?

Greco: O.K. Well, consider this...if there were ever a Third World country which developed a successful and viable economy that lay outside of the influence of western capitalist power, then that country might serve as a successful model for other countries to follow, which might cause that chain of "dominoes" to begin falling. Such a scenario goes against the grain of U.S. interests, and as a result, any Third World country that might have a chance at creating an alternative to the global-capitalist system must be prevented from doing so, in order that it not serve as a model for other countries to follow. This is the internal version of the "domino effect". ⁽³⁾

Suvian: So in that sense, prevention of the "domino effect" serves as a kind of punishment for those countries that are not a part of the western-dominated, capitalist fold, right?

Greco: That's the second interpretation, which seems a more pragmatic one than the first, as it does not appeal to the passions inflamed by propaganda. But in addition to being pragmatic, this internal version is also, in a sense, self-legitimating.

Suvian: How so?

Greco: Well, enforcing such harsh conditions on a country will have the likely effect of enhancing any repressive tendencies already in place, such that the country might try and make an alliance with a perceived enemy of the U.S. (e.g., Russia, China) in order to try and get some help. This then allows the U.S. to portray that country as affiliating with "the enemy", which then serves to justify and further legitimate its original actions* (i.e., the public version of those actions...). That is what I mean by "self-legitimating."

Suvian: Sounds insidious somehow...

Greco: Well, that's because it is. The two versions of the "domino effect" laid out here fit well into an idea put forth by Noam Chomsky, namely that "a substantial part of political discourse is devoted to obscuring the realities of the 'national interest'." The pragmatic, and perhaps even self-serving, version of the "domino effect" belies its public one, which gains its legitimacy by appealing to the fears and passions of the general population, fears and passions which are created to meet, ultimately, the self-serving ends of those in power.

In sum, let it be known that the principle of the "domino effect", originally used to justify U.S. military intervention in Indochina, is still alive and well, having been used in other parts of the world where successful alternatives to the U.S.-global dominated system have gained momentum, such as in Central America and the Caribbean. That those places have endured so much suffering for the realization of a principle should make us reflect critically on the actions of our government, to say the least...
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* I leave it to the reader to decide if action is the best word to use here, or if in light of the facts, another word, such as intervention, or perhaps even more strongly, aggression is the more descriptive term...

(1) http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/domino.html
(2) http://www.usa-presidents.info/union/eisenhower-1.html
(3) see Noam Chomsky, Language and Politics, p.244-245, 308-309.